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Causes of post-merger workforce adjustments 
1.1 Introduction  
 
1.1.1 Research motivation  
 
It is well known that mergers and acquisitions lead to substantial workforce reductions. 
However, systematic empirical evidence on the causes of post-takeover workforce reductions is 
inconclusive. In contrast to the common expectation that workforce reductions are undertaken to 
improve firm performance, some commentators argue that such reductions are undertaken to 
create shareholder value and to regain premiums paid to targets. This chapter provides new 
empirical evidence on the causes of post-merger employee layoffs. Empirical evidence on this 
question would contribute to an understanding of whether post-merger labour management 
decisions are influenced by market-based mechanisms of corporate governance or whether such 
decisions are made on the basis of independent managerial judgements for the purpose of 
achieving success for the company, as required by company law. 
This chapter empirically investigates the factors underlying post-merger employee 
layoffs. Prior research suggests several conflicting factors that may prompt such layoffs. On the 
one hand, it is argued that efficiency improvement through management disciplining and 
elimination of duplicative activities may reduce demand for labour, which may trigger workforce 
reductions. This argument is supported by recent empirical research, which concludes that 
mergers lead to improvements in efficiency. For example, O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) 
report that low labour efficiency in acquired firms leads to a high probability of post-merger job 
losses. Using sophisticated econometric models, a number of recent studies have shown that 
mergers reduce labour demand, leading to significant rationalisations in the use of labour and 
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thereby increasing efficiency (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2002b; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004; Amess et 
al., 2008). Labour demand may decline due to synergy or better labour management post-merger.  
On the other hand, post-merger workforce reductions could be undertaken to achieve 
higher returns on capital and/or to cover high premiums paid to target firm shareholders (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988; Froud et al., 2000; Sirower, 2000). In support of this view, the Krishnan et 
al. (2007) results indicate that managers make post-merger employee layoffs to regain high 
premiums. So, the need for performance improvement, management disciplining, synergy and 
high premiums have all been suggested as possible explanations for post-takeover workforce 
adjustments, implying that there may be different causes of post-merger layoffs
1
. However, no 
one study has investigated the role of these competing factors in explaining post-merger 
workforce adjustments.   
Identifying factors associated with layoffs may give some insights into causes of such 
layoffs. This chapter not only investigates factors leading to post-merger workforce reductions, 
but also factors that may prompt workforce growth. Therefore, in addition to the full sample 
analysis, we undertake further analysis, splitting the full sample into two sub-samples according 
to post-takeover changes in the number of workers: ‘the workforce reduction’ sub-sample 
(‘WFR’ hereafter), where post-merger combined employment levels decline relative to the pre-
merger combined employment level, and ‘the workforce growth’ sub-sample (‘WFG’ hereafter), 
where post-merger employment levels grow relative to the pre-merger employment level. 
                                                 
 
1
 Other factors that may lead to a higher level of workforce adjustments include post-merger asset 
divestments and cash payments during acquisitions. 
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Comparing the performance of these two sub-samples provides further evidence on the factors 
that prompt post-takeover workforce changes.  
First, to investigate the causes of post-merger workforce adjustments, the chapter 
compares pre-takeover operating performance of the WFR and WFG sub-samples using a 
univariate analysis. Next it uses a regression technique to examine the role of target firm under-
performance, hostility, relatedness and a high premium in explaining post-takeover workforce 
changes in the full sample as well as in the sub-samples. 
1.1.2 Brief results and contributions 
 
The results show that post-merger employee layoffs are undertaken in under-performing 
target firms, where there is a need and scope for efficiency improvement. Univariate analysis 
provides weak evidence of under-performance of the WFR sub-sample firms in comparison to the 
WFG sub-sample firms.   
Regressions show that acquired firms’ prior performance explains both post-takeover 
workforce reductions and workforce growth, while acquirers’ prior performance only explains 
workforce growth. The full sample regressions show that related acquisitions lead to a higher 
level of workforce adjustments than unrelated acquisitions do. Hostile and related acquisitions 
lead to slower workforce growth in comparison to friendly and unrelated acquisitions. 
Furthermore, the results show that high premiums are associated with lower workforce 
reductions. At the same time, high premiums are associated with slower workforce growth, 
possibly due to a higher level of synergy resulting from expensive acquisitions. The results imply 
that managers undertake employee layoffs when there is a need for efficiency improvement.  
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The chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying the reasons for post-merger 
workforce adjustments. Overall the results suggest that managers undertake post-merger 
employee layoffs for efficiency improvement purposes, not to create shareholder value at the 
expense of labour, as suggested by prior research (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). There may be 
several different reasons for efficiency improvement: the need to stop further performance 
deterioration, the realisation of synergy or the disciplining of inefficient management. In the long 
run, such efficiency improvements should also benefit employees. Therefore it can be concluded 
that one of the main governance mechanisms for restructuring to maximise shareholder value – 
corporate takeovers – does not necessarily negatively affect labour. 
1.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
 
There is growing evidence on the employment losses post-merger. For example, Black et 
al. (2007) show that higher levels of mergers and acquisitions activity leads to shorter job tenure, 
which means that such transactions involve employee layoffs. Deakin and Slinger (1997) and 
Lehto and Böckerman (2008) conclude that almost all changes in ownership lead to job losses. 
Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) show that mergers significantly reduce the absolute number 
of workers. However, the factors that lead to post-takeover employee layoffs are not well 
understood. On the basis of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, we identify several 
factors that help to explain post-merger employee layoffs. These include: pre-takeover poor 
performance of merging firms, the disciplinary role of takeovers, synergy created by mergers and 
the high premium paid to targets. 
Within the active MCC acquirers target under-performing firms to create shareholder 
value by re-allocating resources to the most efficient users and by improving firm performance 
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(Manne, 1965). Efficient use of resources may also include enhancing labour efficiency through 
workforce reductions. Therefore it is expected that takeovers of under-performing targets may 
lead to workforce reductions. There are several reasons for workforce reductions after such 
efficiency improving takeovers. 
First, employee layoffs may occur when firms already have declining business 
opportunities and related financial problems, as recovering from poor operating performance may 
require cost savings. In such cases, poor performance may also be associated with more 
traditional factors leading to employee layoffs, such as a decline in product demand, arising as a 
result of general business cycle conditions, technological or other industry-wide changes 
(Cappelli, 2000). The extant evidence suggests poor operating performance as one of the main 
antecedents of employee layoffs (Coucke et al., 2007; Hillier et al., 2007). Furthermore, there is 
some evidence showing significant improvement in firm performance after downsizing (Elayan et 
al., 1998; Espahbodi et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2001). Second, low labour productivity may 
precede employee layoffs. Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour cost cuts provide relatively easy 
and unproblematic gains when firms are in a difficult position. Therefore layoffs may be to 
enhance undertaken labour efficiency. O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) report that post-
merger employee layoffs are made to improve labour efficiency. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) 
show that acquisitions involve job losses, while at the same time they improve labour 
productivity. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) and McGuckin et al. (1998) report that ownership 
change causes further improvement in labour productivity. Conyon et al. (2004) show that 
mergers cause significant improvement in employee profitability.  
In sum, the need for performance improvement may necessitate post-merger employee 
layoffs, because when firms perform poorly shareholders expect managers to undertake some 
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restructuring activities (Morck et al., 1989). There may be different reasons for poor 
performance, such as decline in product demand or technological change. This means that 
takeovers undertaken by profit-maximising managers could lead to employee layoffs in the short-
run, although long-run employee wealth concessions depend on the success of mergers. 
Therefore the extent of the employee layoffs should be a function of acquired firms’ pre-takeover 
performance. On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
Q1-H1: The pre-takeover performance of both acquired firms and acquiring firms is 
positively associated with post-takeover workforce adjustments.  
It is suggested that synergetic gains are more likely to motivate friendly mergers, whereas 
gains from replacing inefficient management motivate hostile takeovers (Morck et al., 1990).  
This means that hostile takeovers occur to discipline under-performing managers, who 
may avoid corporate downsizing even if it is required for efficiency improvement. If takeovers 
are motivated by disciplinary reasons, then profit-maximizing managers may undertake higher 
cost cuts after hostile takeovers than after friendly mergers. Therefore the extent of workforce 
reductions should depend on the mode of takeovers.  
Similarly, hostile takeovers may occur to discipline managers who have just opted for a 
‘quiet life’ enjoying managers, who may have increased employment levels above the optimal 
level or may not have exerted enough control to monitor labour efficiency. In other words, 
employment levels may have been sub-optimal due to the behaviour of the incumbent 
management, who may have entrenched themselves and may have been applying inefficient 
labour management practices, leading to performance deterioration. Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) show that when takeover threat is weak, managers may not exert enough effort to monitor 
8 
 
workers and to shut down inefficient plants, but instead avoid difficult labour management 
decisions. They prefer to lead a ‘quiet life’, increasing staffing levels and paying high wages. 
These arguments imply that workforce reductions do not take place, even in under-performing 
firms, when managers are not monitored by external corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
the MCC. Thus, removal of such managers through takeovers should lead to workforce 
adjustment and to acquirers’ undertaking workforce reductions in under-performing firms.  
Although the primary purpose of hostile takeovers is to discipline inefficient 
management, there is growing evidence showing that targets of hostile takeovers are not always 
under-performing firms. This means that hostile takeovers may occur for other reasons. Therefore 
some commentators argue that hostile takeovers do not necessarily occur to correct for 
managerial failure (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). Instead, hostility may 
arise because incumbents expect staff cost cuts and therefore oppose such takeovers to protect 
workers. In other words, hostility may arise due to the incumbents’ disagreement with the 
proposed restructuring measures, such as employee layoffs (Franks and Mayer, 1996).  
At the same time, hostile takeovers are more likely to facilitate wealth transfer from 
employees to shareholders and therefore they are more likely to reduce employment levels 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Hostile takeovers provide high 
premiums (Franks and Mayer, 1996) and generate significantly higher positive abnormal returns 
for both target and bidder shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 
2006). Such gains may come from reneging on implicit contracts between shareholders and 
employees. 
Hostile takeovers may lead to excessive senior-level staff dismissal (Franks and Mayer, 
1996) and higher levels of workforce reductions (Conyon et al., 2001). However, supporting the 
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efficiency enhancement role of hostile takeovers, Conyon et al. (2002a) show that such takeovers 
also cause greater reductions in labour demand: hostile takeovers reduce labour demand by 17%, 
while the decline is 9% after friendly mergers. Similarly, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) report that 
tender offers (hostile in nature) produce significantly different labour demand effects than other 
mergers. The Conyon et al. (2001) results indicate that both hostile and friendly takeovers are 
associated with a similar decrease in labour demand, averaging 7.5%, after controlling for output 
and wage changes. On the basis of these results, the authors suggest that a steep decline in the 
absolute number of workers after hostile takeovers is mainly due to large asset divestment and 
the resulting output decline after such takeovers.  
All of these theories imply that a new management team may undertake the required 
corporate downsizing, meaning that employment reductions should be greater in hostile takeovers 
than in friendly mergers: 
Q1-H2: Hostile takeovers are associated with (i) greater workforce reductions and (ii) 
lower workforce growth than friendly takeovers.  
According to Cappelli (2000) corporate downsizing occurs as a result of the search for 
new operational efficiencies in the use of labour. Synergy created by mergers may lead to such 
rationalisations in the use of labour. Synergy may arise due to the elimination of duplicative 
activities. Thus, employee layoffs could be undertaken to materialise operational synergies, 
arising from economies of scale and scope. The extent of workforce reductions should depend on 
the level of synergies arising as a result of combining two businesses. In this regard synergy has 
been suggested as one of the main rationales for mergers and acquisitions (Sirower, 2000). In 
support of this view, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995a, 2001) conclude that synergy is the main 
motive of takeovers. 
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As the scope for integrating two businesses is greater in related acquisitions than in 
unrelated acquisitions, the former should provide higher synergy: the scope for elimination of 
duplicative activities and other cost cuts should be greater in such cases. Rumelt (1974) argues 
that related diversifications provide superior performance to unrelated diversifications. Thus, 
related acquisitions should lead to higher levels of workforce reductions than unrelated 
acquisitions. In fact, prior empirical evidence shows that acquirers determine optimal 
employment levels taking into consideration synergy resulting from mergers and the required 
level of workforce to produce the combined output. O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) find that 
the probability of layoff announcements is higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions. Furthermore, more recent research shows that related acquisitions reduce labour 
demand more than unrelated acquisitions do (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2002b; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2004). 
In sum, as a result of the elimination of duplicative activities, mergers may reduce 
demand for labour: the combined firm may be able to produce the combined product with a lower 
level of labour. Decline in labour demand may be greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions (Conyon et al., 2002a). On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis will 
be tested:  
Q1-H3: Related acquisitions are associated with (i) greater workforce reductions and (ii) 
lower workforce growth than unrelated acquisitions.  
A growing body of research provides evidence showing that managers pay a high 
premium for acquired firms. Such high premiums require higher returns, which could be achieved 
through labour cost cuts, when other options are limited (Froud et al., 2000). Therefore a high 
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premium was suggested as one of the main reasons for post-merger workforce reductions 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Krishnan et al., 2007).   
Acquiring firm managers may pay high premiums as a result of over-optimism: they may 
systematically over-estimate their managerial capabilities and expected synergies (Roll, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005). In fact, due to information asymmetries and difficulties in 
estimating synergies, even rational managers may overpay for targets. Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) empirical work shows a strong relationship between size of premium and CEO hubris, 
measured with several variables, such as acquiring firms’ recent performance and recent media 
praise for the CEO. Sirower (2000) claims that many of these premium payments have created a 
requirement for performance improvements that are virtually impossible to realize, even by the 
best executives in the best of industry conditions. Thus, one available option for managers is to 
cut costs. Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour cost is the largest cost component that can be 
easily cut. Krishnan et al. (2007) argue that high premiums are the main factor leading to post-
merger workforce reductions and that there is a positive association between premiums paid and 
the number of workers laid off post-merger, as their results show. 
However, under strong pressure from the MCC to maximise shareholder value, managers 
may pay low premiums for under-performing businesses and subsequently undertake wide-scale 
restructuring to turn these businesses around. Similarly, managers may increase shareholder value 
by acquiring better performing firms with growing business opportunities, which may require 
higher levels of premium. Franks and Mayer (1996) study indicates that target firms were not 
poorly performing firms. Many authors  argue that acquirers target better performing firms 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). In such acquisitions, incumbents 
reject offers in order to secure high premiums. The following hypothesis will be tested:   
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Q1-H4: The higher the premium, (i) the higher the workforce reductions and (ii) the 
lower the workforce growth.  
1.3 Data and methodology  
1.3.1 Econometric model specification 
 
To test the above hypotheses, the following model will be estimated: 
  BoardLevSizePremRHROAROAE preA
pre
T 87654321
 (1) 
where E is the change in the number of employees from t-1 to t+3, preTROA  and 
pre
AROA  
represent the average industry-adjusted performance, for acquired and acquiring firms 
respectively, for the two years prior to takeovers; H is a hostility dummy, which takes 1 if the 
initial offer was rejected and 0 otherwise; R is a relatedness dummy, which takes 1 if both target 
and acquiring firms are in the same industry and 0 otherwise; Prem is the premium, measured as 
the excess amount of bid price over share price one month prior to takeover announcement; Size 
is the ratio of acquiring firm size to the transaction value (target firm size); Lev is the debt-to-
equity ratio at the end of the takeover completion year; Board is the ratio of non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors, and   indicates the error term. In extended models we 
also include the interactions of the R and H dummies with pre-takeover performance of target 
firms ( preTROA ). 
In the model we control for relative size, leverage and board structure on the basis of prior 
research findings. First, the integration of larger firms may create a greater challenge as well as 
more synergy than the integration of smaller firms. In this respect, McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) 
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and Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) find that the impact of acquisitions depends on the size of 
acquisition. Therefore we control for the relative size, measured as the ratio of acquired firm size 
(transaction value) relative to acquirers’ market value at the end of t-1. Ofek (1993) argues that 
higher leverage following poor performance increases the probability of corporate restructuring, 
including employee layoffs. Therefore in the takeover context higher leverage may also force 
acquirers to cut costs by reducing the workforce. We measure leverage as the ratio of debt to total 
assets at the beginning of the relevant year. Finally, a higher number of non-executives on the 
Board of Directors may force managers to undertake restructuring activities that maximise 
shareholder value and prior research suggests that higher the number of non-executive directors, 
the more effective the Board (Cosh et al., 2006; Yawson, 2006). Therefore we control for the 
Board composition of the acquiring firms. 
1.3.2 Data 
 
A sample of takeovers of UK public companies occurring during the period 1990-2000 was hand-
collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal. Subsequent transactions undertaken by multiple 
acquirers were excluded from the sample: i.e. only one acquisition per acquirer within any 
consecutive five years was included in the sample. After the exclusion of mergers involving 
financial institutions, property companies and utility companies, the sample consists of 235 
mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, we required availability of financial data for at least one 
year for both acquired and acquiring firms during the pre-takeover period and for at least one 
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year for the acquiring firms during the post-takeover period
2
. Financial data was obtained from 
Datastream, and in some cases complemented with data from sample firms’ Annual Reports, 
downloaded from the Nexis
®
 database. 
One month premium is usually used to control for rumours about takeovers and to 
determine the true size of the premium. As in other studies this variable is defined as the 
difference between the purchase price and the price 30 days before takeover, divided by the price 
30 days before takeover (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 2000).  
Data on acquirer boards’ composition has been collected from Hemmington-Scott 
Corporate Registers. Following Cosh et al. (2006) and Yawson (2006), the collected data 
includes the size of board (total number of directors) and composition of boards (number of 
executive and non-executive shareholders). 
Table 1 reports summary descriptive statistics for the variables. Panel A shows 
employment and annual average wage rate for acquired firms and their matched firms, while 
Panel B reports similar data for acquiring firms and their matching firms. The average number of 
employees in the acquiring firms is nearly four times higher than the average number of 
employees in the acquired firms. The data also reveals that the WFR sub-sample firms are larger 
than the WFG sub-sample firms. Panel C of the table reports other variables used in this thesis. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
 
2
 We collect data for the period of three years before the takeover completion year and three years 
after the takeover completion year. In most cases we have data for all three of the pre-takeover 
years and the three-year post-takeover periods.  
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Full 
sample
Matched 
firms' 
sample
WFR sub-
sample
WFG sub-
sample
Panel A: Acquired firms' employment data
Number of employees Mean 3,313      2,088      4,485      1,586      
Median 770         706         1,096      623         
Std. Dev. 9,067      4,729      11,068    4,295      
Panel B: Acquiring firms' employment data
Number of employees Mean 13,088    9,214      16,427    8,167      
Median 2,975      2,661      3,285      2,903      
Std. Dev. 27,036    16,740    32,413    15,000    
Panel C: Other variables
Hostility dummy (1=hostile, 0=friendly) number 52 34 18
Relatedness dummy (1=in the same industry, 0=otherwise) number 136 72 64
Premium % 39 38 40
Relative size of acquired and acquiring firms ratio 0.60 0.67 0.50
Leverage ratio 0.47 0.48 0.45
Board composition (ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors)ratio 0.44 0.44 0.43
Number of observations number 235 470 111 95
 Notes: In 29 observations there is no data for the second and/or third post-takeover year; these are excluded from the sample 
when the sample is divided into the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Therefore the total number of observations in the WFR and 
WFG sub-samples differs from the full-sample observations. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables.    
 
1.3.3 Measuring post-takeover workforce adjustments 
 
A firm’s workforce is measured by the number of employees, using Datastream data, which 
represents the average number of both full and part-time employees of the firm. The pre-takeover 
pro-forma combined employment level is computed by summing the target and bidder’s 
workforce at the end of t-1. Then the post-takeover employee change variable is created by 
deducting this pro-forma number of employees from the acquirers’ number of employees at the 
end of the third post-takeover year.  
Following Yawson (2006) we divide the full sample into the WFG and WFR sub-samples 
on the basis of the percentage change in the number of employees over a three-year period after 
the takeover completion year:  
)log()log(% 13   tt EEE ,        
 (3) where E% denotes the percentage change in employment, E denotes the number of 
employees. If, for an acquirer, the employment percentage change is positive, then this acquirer is 
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included in the WFG sub-sample; if negative, then the acquirer is included in the WFR sub-
sample. 
1.4 Results 
 
1.4.1 Univariate analysis of merging firms’ pre-takeover performance 
 
This section reports the results of univariate analysis of acquired and acquiring firms’ pre-
takeover operating performance. Operating performance is measured using Earnings before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA), divided by Total Assets, (hereafter 
‘Returns On Assets’, (ROA)). This performance measure is adjusted using two benchmarks: 
industry-median firm and industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmarks. Barber and 
Lyon (1996) argue that in detecting abnormal operating performance non-parametric Wilcoxon 
test statistics are more powerful than parametric t statistics. Therefore the significance of the 
adjusted performance is tested using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, while the 
significance of the difference between the WFG and WFR sub-groups is tested using the two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
As Panel A of Table 2 shows, the WFG sub-sample acquired firms’ performance does not 
differ significantly from their industry-median performance, while they outperform their matched 
firms in year t-1. The WFR acquired firms’ performance does not differ from their industry-
median performance either, while they outperform their matched firms only three years before 
takeovers. This suggests that the WFR acquired firms’ performance declines immediately before 
takeovers and this performance decline may require some restructuring activities. However, both 
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benchmarks show that there is no significant difference between the performance of acquired 
firms in the WFG and WFR sub-samples.  
Table 2. Pre-takeover performance of the acquired and acquiring firms, split into WFG and WFR sub-samples 
Pre-takeover 
years
Unadjusted 
performance
z-stat
Industry median 
firm adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Matched firm 
adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Panel A: Acquired firms' pre-takeover performance
A-1: Full sample acquired firms  
 t-3 0.1942 -0.0084 0.07 0.0125 1.94
 t-2 0.1913 -0.0030 -0.08 0.0121 0.35
 t-1 0.1724 -0.0076 -0.56 0.0030 1.73
A-2: The WFG sub-sample acquired firms  
 t-3 0.1848 -0.0133 -0.28 -0.0036 0.55
 t-2 0.1912 0.0010 0.07 -0.0132 -0.70
 t-1 0.1691 -0.0076 -0.51 0.0064 2.01
A-3: The WFR sub-sample acquired firms
 t-3 0.2044 0.0000 0.37 0.0177 2.11
 t-2 0.2000 -0.0046 -0.14 0.0191 1.09
 t-1 0.1787 -0.0049 -0.36 0.0008 0.63
A-4: Difference between the WFG and the WFR sub-samples acquired firms' performance
 t-3 -0.0196 -1.10 -0.0133 -0.58 -0.0213 -0.89
 t-2 -0.0088 -0.21 0.0057 0.13 -0.0323 -1.25
 t-1 -0.0097 -0.26 -0.0027 -0.21 0.0055 1.09
Panel B: Acquiring firms' pre-takeover performance
B-1: Full sample acquiring firms
 t-3 0.2422 0.0158 2.90 0.0152 0.52
 t-2 0.2303 0.0209 4.32 0.0105 1.06
 t-1 0.2307 0.0432 6.42 0.0053 2.84
B-2: The WFG sub-sample acquiring firms 
 t-3 0.2578 0.0592 3.95 0.0030 -0.13
 t-2 0.2576 0.0522 4.25 0.0063 0.63
 t-1 0.2488 0.0632 5.75 0.0066 2.54
B-3: The WFR sub-sample acquiring firms
 t-3 0.2313 0.0032 0.39 0.0206 0.78
 t-2 0.2146 0.0094 1.96 0.0170 0.89
 t-1 0.2149 0.0270 3.59 0.0038 1.68
B-4: Difference between the WFG and the WFR sub-sample acquiring firms' performance
 t-3 0.0265 1.43 0.0560 3.01 -0.0175 -0.67
 t-2 0.0430 1.78 0.0428 2.59 -0.0108 -0.12
 t-1 0.0339 1.30 0.0363 2.08 0.0028 0.80
 Notes: This table reports the median performance.  
As Panel B reports, the WFG acquirers outperform their industry-median firms during all 
three pre-takeover years and outperform their matched firms in year t-1. Similarly, the WFR 
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acquirers outperform their industry-median firms during two pre-takeover years and outperform 
their matched firms in year t-1, although it is only significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the 
results show that the WFG acquirers perform significantly better than those WFR acquirers in all 
three pre-takeover years, when the industry-median firm benchmark is used. However, acquirers’ 
pre-takeover performances in these two groups do not differ from each other, when the matched 
firm benchmark is used.  
Several important points emerge from this analysis. In general it is believed that acquired 
firms are not underperforming firms (Franks and Mayer, 1996, 1997). However, our analysis 
provides some evidence showing that the WFR acquired firms’ performance declines 
immediately prior to takeovers. In contrast, the WFG acquired firms outperform their matched 
firms before the takeover event year, whereas the WFR acquired firms perform similarly to their 
matched firms. At the same time, the WFG acquirers’ performance is significantly better that the 
WFR acquirers’ performance. These two factors together suggest that managers undertake post-
merger employee layoffs in underperforming firms. Another point is that acquirers outperform 
both industry-median firms and matched firms immediately prior to acquisitions. This confirms 
the view that acquirers undertake mergers during or immediately after high performance years. 
This analysis suggests that managers make post-merger workforce reductions to stop 
further performance deterioration or to improve efficiency in labour usage. Workforce reductions 
could be undertaken to discipline those managers who enjoy a ‘quiet life’, removing such 
managers through hostile takeovers. At the same time layoffs could be undertaken to achieve 
synergies through the elimination of duplicative activities, even though the performance has not 
been poor. On the other hand, employee layoffs could be undertaken to achieve higher levels of 
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cost-savings to cover high premiums paid for acquisitions. The next section investigates these 
reasons for post-merger employee layoffs in the multiple regression contexts.  
1.4.2 Multivariate analysis of the causes of post-takeover employment 
adjustments 
 
As previously discussed, there may be several reasons for post-merger workforce 
adjustments. This section reports the results of regressions of post-takeover workforce 
adjustments on merging firms’ pre-takeover performance, hostility (a management disciplining 
measure), relatedness (a measure of synergy created by mergers) and premium. We run separate 
regressions for the full sample, as well as for the WFR and WFG sub-samples. The extended 
models include the interactions of the hostility (relatedness) dummy variable with the pre-
takeover performance of acquired firms. 
As Table 3 shows, acquired firms’ pre-takeover performance is positively related to the 
post-takeover workforce changes. In the full sample, a one unit higher performance of acquired 
firms leads to 0.53% higher employment growth. The WFR sub-sample regression indicates that 
there is a negative association between the pre-takeover target performance and post-takeover 
workforce reductions, meaning that the poorer the acquired firms’ performance, the greater the 
post-merger workforce reductions
3
. Specifically, a one unit lower performance causes a 0.38% 
                                                 
 
3
 Equation (3) determines the percentage workforce reductions in negative numbers. However, in 
the WFR sub-sample dataset, the percentage workforce reductions are entered in absolute terms. 
So, in this sub-sample, the workforce reductions are given with positive signs, although in the full 
sample they have negative signs.    
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greater workforce reduction. The positive coefficient of the target firm pre-takeover performance 
variable in the WFG sub-sample regression confirms this association: the higher the performance, 
the higher the workforce growth. Therefore the results support the hypothesis that post-takeover 
adjustments are positively associated with the pre-takeover performance of acquired firms.   
The full sample regression shows that acquirers’ prior performance does not explain the 
changes in employment levels, though this variable is only significant in the WFG sub-sample. 
Thus, acquirers’ prior performance only explains employment growth rather than employment 
reductions. In contrast, in the WFR sub-sample, there is no association between acquirers’ prior 
performance and subsequent workforce change. This provides partial support for the hypothesis 
that post-takeover workforce adjustments are positively associated with the pre-takeover 
performance of acquiring firms: better performing acquirers further increase their workforce. 
Table 3. Regressions explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments.   
Independent variables Full sample WFR WFG Full sample WFR WFG
Acquired firm pre-takeover performance 0.528*** - 0.380*** 0.334** 0.230 - 0.145 0.989***
Acquiring firm pre-takeover performance 0.353 0.145 0.371*** 0.195 0.133 0.412
Hostility dummy - 0.021 - 0.048 - 0.060 - 0.007 - 0.035 - 0.105*
Relatedness dummy 0.133*** - 0.009 - 0.094* 0.176*** - 0.026 - 0.041
Premium 0.001 - 0.107* - 0.165** 0.059 - 0.078 - 0.049
Relative size - 0.017 0.017 0.014 - 0.021 0.023 0.001
Leverage - 0.687*** 0.150 - 0.020 - 0.649*** 0.314** 0.041
Board structure - 0.203 0.068 0.075 - 0.238 0.114 0.123
Hostility dummy · Acquired firm performance - 0.509 0.055 - 3.088***
Relatedness dummy · Acquired firm performance 0.251 - 0.247 - 0.772**
Constant 0.266** 0.240*** 0.401*** 0.188 0.143 0.235*
F-stat 7.12 4.38 4.34 5.75 2.87 7.20
Adjusted R-square 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.21
Number of observations 180 89 86 180 89 83
Notes: Dependent variables are workforce change in the full sample, workforce reduction in the WFR sub-sample and workforce 
growth in the WFG sub-sample. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables.  
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Although the signs of the hostility dummy regressor are negative, the coefficients are not 
significant
4
. In the models that include interaction terms, the results show that workforce growth 
is significantly lower after hostile takeovers relative to workforce growth after friendly 
acquisitions. So, only one model provides support for the hypothesis that hostility leads to lower 
workforce growth. In the WFG sub-sample the interaction term between hostility and target pre-
takeover performance enter the model with significant negative coefficient, meaning that there is 
a significant difference in the effect of pre-takeover performance on workforce growth in hostile 
versus friendly takeovers. In hostile acquisitions a one point higher pre-takeover target 
performance causes 2.1% [= 0.989 – 3.088] slower employment growth. Previous research shows 
that hostile takeovers involve high levels of asset divestment during post-merger years, which 
may result in lower employment growth. 
The full sample regressions show that related acquisitions lead to higher level workforce 
change during a post-takeover period than unrelated acquisitions, as shown by the significant and 
positive coefficient of the relatedness dummy regressor
5
. However, although the relatedness 
                                                 
 
4
 This may be due to a small number of hostile takeovers in the WFR and WFG sub-samples. 
Another argument is that after controlling for under-performance, hostile takeovers may not be 
able to explain workforce adjustments. 
5
 In this regression the intercept shows the expected post-merger workforce change for unrelated 
acquisitions, when the relatedness dummy takes 0. When the relatedness dummy takes 1, the sum 
of the intercept and the relatedness dummy shows the expected post-merger workforce change. 
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dummy regressor coefficient is negative in the WFR sub-sample, it is not significant. The WFG 
regression shows that related acquisitions cause a significantly lower increase in the number of 
workers than unrelated acquisitions. These results are consistent with prior research. For 
example, O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) report that the probability of employee layoffs is 
higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. Similarly, decline in labour demand 
is greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions due to the existence of synergy in 
such mergers. In contrast, in the WFG sub-sample the interaction term between the relatedness 
dummy and acquired firm pre-takeover performance enters the model with significant negative 
coefficient, meaning that there is a significant difference in the effect of pre-takeover 
performance on employment growth in related versus unrelated takeovers. For example, in 
unrelated acquisitions a one point higher pre-takeover performance causes 1% higher 
employment growth, while in related acquisitions this effect is 0.2% [= 0.989 – 0.772].  
The negative coefficient of the premium implies that highly paid acquisitions lead to 
lower levels of workforce reductions. This result supports the view that acquirers pay lower 
premiums for under-performing firms, but subsequently undertake employee layoffs as a part of 
corporate restructuring to turn around acquired businesses. In contrast to this, the WFG 
regression shows that there is an inverse relationship between premium and workforce growth. 
This negative association suggests that acquirers pay high premiums for the targets with high 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
The positive coefficient in the relatedness dummy indicates a higher level of post-takeover 
workforce change in the case of related acquisitions, after controlling for other relevant variables.    
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expected synergy arising from merging the human resources of two businesses. One of the 
sources of synergy may be the scope for elimination of duplicative activities, as a result of which 
there will be high cost savings. This higher scope for synergy results in lower employment 
growth in such acquisitions where high premium have been paid.  
Among the control variables, only leverage is significantly associated with post-takeover 
workforce change: higher leverage leads to lower employment growth. The other two control 
variables – relative size and board structure – do not significantly affect workforce change. 
In sum, the regression results indicate that acquired firms’ performance explains both the 
extent of workforce reductions and workforce growth, while acquirers’ pre-merger performance 
explains only workforce growth. There is some evidence showing that hostile takeovers cause 
lower workforce growth, while related acquisitions lead to higher workforce adjustments. At the 
same time, the premium is inversely related to both workforce reduction and workforce growth. 
This means that a higher premium is associated with lower workforce reductions. At the same 
time, a higher premium is also associated with lower workforce growth. Thus, the results of this 
chapter show that high premiums do not cause excessive post-merger employee layoffs, which 
contradicts prior research results.  
1.5 Discussion 
 
The chapter investigates prior performance of acquired and acquiring firms, hostility, 
relatedness and high premiums as possible explanations for post-takeover workforce adjustments.  
The results support the hypothesis that both acquired and acquiring firms’ prior 
performance determines post-takeover workforce adjustments (Q1-H1). Univariate analysis 
shows that workforce reductions are undertaken in under-performing acquired firms. Regression 
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analyses indicate that in the WFR sub-sample acquired firms’ low performance is associated with 
higher post-takeover workforce reduction, while in the WFG sub-sample acquired firms’ higher 
performance is associated with faster post-takeover workforce growth. Furthermore, univariate 
analysis shows that the WFR sub-sample acquirers’ performance does not differ from their 
industry and control firms’ performance, while the WFG sub-sample acquirers outperform non-
merging firms. Regressions show that acquirers’ prior performance only explains post-takeover 
workforce growth.  
There is some evidence supporting the hypothesis that hostility leads to higher levels of 
employee layoffs (Q1-H2). The WFG sub-sample regressions show that hostile acquisitions lead 
to slower workforce growth in comparison to friendly acquisitions. However, although it is 
negative, the coefficient of this dummy regressor is not significant in the WFR sub-sample.  
The full sample regressions show that post-takeover workforce adjustment in related 
acquisitions is higher than in unrelated acquisitions. The WFG sub-sample regressions also show 
that related acquisitions also lead to slower workforce growth in comparison to unrelated 
acquisitions (Q1-H3). This is consistent with prior research conclusions suggesting that related 
acquisitions lead to a higher level of rationalisation in the use of labour than unrelated 
acquisitions do (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2004). 
However, the results do not support the hypothesis that high premiums lead to higher 
post-merger employee layoffs (Q1-H4). This result contradicts prior research conclusions. The 
results show that high premiums are associated with lower workforce reductions, but are also 
associated with slower workforce growth, possibly due to the wider scope for synergy arising 
from good acquisitions. In brief, the results show that managers do not undertake employee 
layoffs to cover high premiums, as suggested by prior empirical evidence (Krishnan et al., 2007). 
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The inverse relationship between premium and workforce reduction implies that acquirers do not 
pay high premiums for under-performing targets or for businesses with declining product demand 
that require corporate restructuring, including downsizing. But acquirers may pay high premiums 
for acquisitions that create a wider scope for synergy. In support of this view, the results show 
that the premium negatively affects workforce growth. Overall, the results imply that post-merger 
labour management decisions are not affected by the shareholder value creation requirements of 
the market model of corporate governance. Instead, management decisions are made on the basis 
of independent managerial judgments to provide success and viability for their businesses 
through efficiency enhancement, as suggested by Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Pendleton 
(2009). 
One limitation of this study is that we do not control for asset divestments, which may be 
one of the main reasons for workforce reductions. Workforce levels may also decline due to 
divestments and asset sales, while employment growth could be due to new acquisitions. 
Although we controlled for multiple acquisitions, it was not possible to control for divestment 
activities due to data limitations.  
1.6 Conclusions 
 
Although it is generally agreed that takeovers lead to workforce reductions, the reasons 
for such workforce reductions and their effect on operating performance is debatable. Indeed, 
while some authors argue that mergers reduce labour demand and consequently managers 
undertake workforce reductions to improve labour efficiency and to derive operating synergy 
(Conyon et al., 2002a), other authors argue that managers undertake excessive employee layoffs 
to cover high premiums paid for acquisitions and that these negatively affect operating 
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performance (Krishnan et al., 2007). This chapter empirically investigates the factors leading to 
post-takeover workforce changes.  
The results of this chapter imply that managers do not undertake employee layoffs to 
create shareholder value, but they do so to improve firm performance. The results do not support 
the view that takeover premiums lead to excessive job losses. Instead, a high premium is 
associated with lower workforce reductions and slower workforce growth. Layoffs are 
undertaken on the basis of acquired firms’ pre-takeover performance: the poorer the targets’ 
performance, the greater the reduction in employment, and the higher the target performance, the 
higher the growth in post-takeover employment levels. Furthermore, related acquisitions cause 
higher levels of workforce adjustments. Therefore it can be concluded that the optimal 
employment-related decisions are usually made to achieve the corporate success rather than to 
maximise shareholder returns.  
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